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 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISMt
 To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That Is The Question
 By HARVEY E. LAPAN AND TODD SANDLER*
 In November 1986, news media revela-
 tions disclosed that the Reagan Administra-
 tion had deviated significantly from its stated
 policy of never negotiating with terrorists
 when it traded arms to obtain the freedom
 of three Americans-Rev. Benjamin Weir in
 September 1985, Rev. Lawrence Jenco in
 July 1986, and David Jacobsen in November
 1986. On January 26, 1987, terrorists, posing
 as policemen, kidnapped an Indian and three
 American professors at the American Uni-
 versity of Beirut, thereby replacing the three
 Americans previously bartered away. Ac-
 cepted wisdom, heard almost daily in news-
 casts, maintains that one should never
 bargain with terrorists since such negotia-
 tions encourage more hostage taking by
 making it a profitable activity; recent events
 in Beirut seem to support conventional views.
 Yet even the staunchest supporter of the
 no-negotiation strategy of precommitment,
 the Israelis, has made noteworthy exceptions
 in the case of the school children taken
 hostage at Maalot in May 1974,' and during
 the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June
 1985. Another exception involved the Israe-
 lis' release of 1,150 Arab prisoners, including
 Kozo Okomato, in a negotiated swap for
 three Israeli soldiers in May 1985 (The
 Economist, 1987, p. 29). Okomato, a Japanese
 Red Army Faction member, was the sole
 surviving terrorist in the Lod Airport mas-
 sacre of 1972, which left 27 people dead and
 78 injured.
 We use economic analysis in a simple
 game-theory framework to ascertain under
 what circumstances a government would
 want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation
 strategy. From the government viewpoint,
 we examine both the choice of deterrence
 expenditure (i.e., expense meant to reduce
 terrorist logistical success during incidents)
 and whether to negotiate or not.
 Our analysis demonstrates that the beliefs
 and the resolve of the terrorists are crucial in
 identifying the rather restrictive scenarios in
 which a no-negotiation strategy is desirable
 in the case of a credible precommitment.2
 When governmental declarations are not
 completely credible and uncertainty char-
 acterizes the government's costs of not nego-
 tiating, then never negotiating is likely to be
 time inconsistent and not a plausible policy.
 In a multiperiod model, reputation effects
 may not be sufficient for a government to
 maintain a policy of never negotiating with
 hostage-taking terrorists owing to public
 choice considerations. Perhaps surprising,
 the conventional wisdom regarding the no-
 negotiation strategy does not withstand theo-
 retical scrutiny except in a limited number of
 contrived cases.
 I. Basic Structure of the Models
 The analysis focuses on terrorist incidents
 that involve the taking of hostages (for ex-
 ample, skyjackings, kidnappings) for the
 purpose of gaining concessions (for example,
 ransoms, prisoners releases). There are two
 agents in the game-the terrorist group and
 the government; hostages are treated as ex-
 ogenous participants. Initially, we present
 tDiscussants: Mancur Olson, University of
 Maryland; John Tschirhart, University of Wyoming;
 Benjamin Zycher, Rand Corporation.
 *Department of Economics, Iowa State University,
 Ames, IA 50011.
 'Descriptions and details of transnational terrorist
 events between 1968 and 1979 are drawn from Edward
 Mickolus (1980).
 2 On terrorist rationality, see Scott Atkinson, Sandler,
 and John Tschirhart (1987).
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 FIGURE 1. GAME TREE-PERIOD t
 the underlying structure for a multiperiod
 sequential game that degenerates readily to a
 single-period game. In each period, the
 government has two potential strategic vari-
 ables: how much to expend to deter an at-
 tack, and whether to negotiate or not in the
 event of a terrorist logistical success, whereby
 the terrorists manage to secure one or more
 hostages. The terrorists need to decide
 whether to attack. In Figure 1, the extensive
 form for this sequential game is displayed,
 complete with payoffs. First, the government
 chooses its tth period expenditures, Dt, to
 deter an attack; second, the terrorists decide
 whether to attack; and third, the government
 determines whether to negotiate in the event
 of a terrorist logistical success. The optimal
 strategy for each agent depends on its payoff
 in each state and the beliefs that it holds as
 to the likelihood attached to each state. For
 any given state, the top number in the payoff
 vectors of Figure 1 denotes the terrorists' net
 benefit or cost, while the bottom number
 depicts the government's cost.
 In period t, the terrorists receive 0 if they
 do not attack. In the event of an attack,
 three outcomes are possible: (i) the attack
 fails; (ii) the attack succeeds but the negoti-
 ation fails; and (iii) the attack and negotia-
 tion succeed. We assume that outcome i
 imposes a net cost of c on the terrorists,
 whereas outcomes ii and iii yield a net
 benefit of I and m, respectively, to the ter-
 rorists. The net benefit for a logistical success
 that does not produce concessions may be
 positive or negative. For a media-attracting
 skyjacking, publicity for a terrorist cause
 might make I positive even when conces-
 sions are zero. In the case of kidnappings,
 however, I is more apt to be negative, since
 the capture and subsequent maintenance of
 a hostage in a secret location is usually an
 expensive operation. The expected payoff
 (Zt) to the terrorists from an attack also
 depends upon the probability (0t) that the
 terrorists attach to a logistical failure and the
 probability (Pt) that they attach to govern-
 ment capitulation.3 Hence, from Figure 1,
 the terrorists' expected payoff from an attack
 is equal to
 (1) Z = (1-Ot) [PtM +(1-Pt)l]-Otc,
 where m> 1> - c and m > 0. The terrorists
 will attack whenever their expected payoff is
 positive; that is, whenever
 (2) c < c*-[(1- t)10t]
 X [ ptm + (I1-pt)l]
 From (2), the likelihood of an attack in-
 creases as either the probability of success
 (1- Ot) or the perceived likelihood of gov-
 ernment capitulation (pt) increases. Equa-
 tion (2) indicates that even a credible policy
 3The time subscripts are introduced to allow subse-
 quent generalization to a multiperiod setting.
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 of precommitment never to negotiation,
 which in turn implies that p, = 0, may be
 insufficient to deter an attack if the terrorists
 derive net benefits from logistical success
 (I > 0), from, say, publicity, even in the ab-
 sence of concessions. The no-negotiation
 precommitment may also be insufficient to
 deter attacks when the cost associated with a
 logistical failure is low or negative.
 In fact, terrorist groups that perceive ben-
 efits from logistical failure and logistical
 success ending in negotiation failure (I > - c
 > 0) will attack regardless of a credible pre-
 commitment strategy. The Hezbollah, a
 pro-Iranian Shiite Fundamentalist terrorist
 group operating out of the Bekaa Valley in
 Lebanon, places a high value on martyrdom
 and could be placed in this category of
 groups. Not only does martyrdom give the
 victim a high perceived benefit, it assists the
 group to recruit. In a U.S. Department of
 State (1986, p. 19) report, the Hezbollah was
 said to hold many of the hostages taken in
 recent years in Beirut. Furthermore, the
 Hezbollah has been connected to the suicide
 bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks in
 October 1983, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in
 April 1983, and the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait
 in December 1983. For the Hezbollah, the
 conventional wisdom regarding negotiations
 would not hold, since net benefits are de-
 rived under any outcome. A credible pre-
 commitment policy would, however, deter
 attacks if the group was solely motivated by
 concessions.
 Turning to the government behavior, we
 denote its expenditure on deterring (and foil-
 ing) terrorist attacks as D,. This expenditure
 will determine, along with nature, the ter-
 rorists' perceived probability of failure (0)
 and will be incurred in all states. Govern-
 ment costs depicted in Figure 1 indicate that
 if no attack occurs, the government incurs
 no additional costs, but if an attack occurs
 and fails, the government incurs an ad-
 ditional cost of a ( > 0). If, however, an
 attack succeeds, the government must then
 decide whether to capitulate or not. The
 (current) cost of not capitulating is denoted
 by n, and reflects the cost associated with
 hostage lives and resources expended. If the
 government does capitulate, it incurs a cur-
 rent cost h, which may include perceived
 political cost and the cost associated with
 the consequences of freeing terrorists or aug-
 menting terrorists' resources. Nevertheless,
 neither n, nor h include reputational effects
 associated with negotiating at this juncture.
 In a true multiperiod setting, the government
 must consider how its negotiating behavior
 will affect its reputation by influencing the
 terrorists' perceived pt, and hence the likeli-
 hood of an attack in the future. Moreover, a
 government must be concerned whether it
 can take current actions to alter terrorists'
 beliefs about the government's willingness to
 negotiate. One such posture that is often
 suggested is a precommitment policy never
 to negotiate, which we term credible pro-
 vided that p, = 0 for all future t.
 The government influences the terrorists'
 perceived failure rate through its expenditure
 on deterrence, in which
 (3) 0O = K(D,) or D, = K-1(0,)-H 0,
 where H(O) = 0, limo 1H(O,) = x, H'> 0,
 and H"> 0. We further assume that the
 government does not know the resolve or
 fanaticism of the terrorists so that c ? 0 is a
 random variable with a probability density
 function of f(c). From the government's
 perspective, the probability of an attack is
 the likelihood4 that c < c* (see (2)), that is
 (4) prob{ c < c*} = f, =cf(c)dc.
 Since c* in (4) depends on terrorists' beliefs
 concerning capitulation and logistical suc-
 cess, the likelihood of an attack clearly de-
 pends on these beliefs, (i.e., Q, = F(01, pt)).
 By reducing the likelihood of a logistical
 success, increased deterrence expenditure
 would lower the perceived probability of an
 attack. Furthermore, an increase in ter-
 rorists' belief regarding government capitula-
 4An alternative, but qualitatively similar, interpreta-
 tion is to assume that there are many (N) terrorist
 groups with the distribution of their values given by
 f(c). Then Q2 represents the proportion of groups that
 attack; Q&N is the number of such attacks.
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 tion encourages terrorist strikes. These re-
 sults follow from partially differentiating (4)
 and the assumptions invoked thus far.
 Throughout, the two agents are assumed to
 have identical beliefs of the likelihood of
 attack.
 II. Single-Period Model:
 No Reputational Effects
 In the single-period model, the govern-
 ment ignores reputation effects and takes as
 given the terrorists' belief, Pt, that the
 government will negotiate. If the negotiation
 decision is made ex post, the government
 would minimize its cost by negotiating if,
 and only if, capitulating is less costly (i.e.,
 n t > h). Hence, ex post cost in the event of a
 logistical success is min(nt, h). From an
 ex ante perspective, expected cost to the
 government is
 (5) E[TCt] =H(at)++Qt6ta
 + Qti(I - ft)E [min(nt, h)],
 where nt is a random variable with a density
 function g(n), and E[.] is the expectations
 operator. The government determines its op-
 timal level of deterrence by choosing Ot
 ex ante to minimize (5). If h lies inside
 the range of n t, then it is easy to show
 that E[min(nt, h)] < min[E(nt, h)]. This fact
 proves helpful when identifying costs associ-
 ated with the precommitment strategy of
 never negotiating.
 We denote At* as the argmin E[TCt] and
 TCt* as minimized expected cost. A simple
 comparative static analysis of the first-order
 conditions of (5) indicates that the optimal
 level of deterrence increases as (i) the likeli-
 hood of attack goes up, (ii) the expected
 cost of successful attacks rises, and (iii) the
 ability to deter attacks increases (i.e., io,=
 dfQ2/d OA rises).5 Furthermore, since the like-
 lihood of attack is an increasing function of
 pt, the optimal level of deterrence is also an
 increasing function of the government's be-
 liefs of the terrorists' own beliefs concerning
 the government's willingness to capitulate.
 Finally, one might wonder where the ter-
 rorists' beliefs concerning capitulation are
 derived. If the terrorists know how the
 government behaves and if they further know
 the true distribution of the government cost
 from not capitulating, then consistency of
 expectations implies that p, = prob[n, > h].
 We are now prepared to examine the de-
 sirability of precommitment never to negoti-
 ate when deterrence expenditure is also a
 choice variable. In this case, Q denotes the
 ex ante probability of an attack when pre-
 commitment is credible (Q- = F(6t,O)). If the
 government adheres to its pledge, its ex-
 pected costs are then
 (6) TCf = H(6,) + Qta6a + f2t(1-0)E(n,)
 where E(n,) indicates the expected cost of a
 successful attack, given that negotiations
 cannot occur. A comparison of (5) and (6)
 indicates that if a policy of precommitment
 eliminates all attacks (i.e., Q = 0 when
 evaluated at 04*), then precommitment dom-
 inates the ex post decision. When, however,
 precommitment does not eliminate all at-
 tacks, precommitment would imply higher
 ex post costs from inflexibility in those inci-
 dents where costs would be minimized by
 capitulating (i.e., E(nt) > E[min(nt, h)]).
 Thus, precommitment, even when credible,
 may not be optimal. In addition, when Qt > 0
 and an attack occurs, the government may
 face a time consistency problem since hold-
 ing firm to its policy may be more costly
 than capitulating. To compare the optimiz-
 ing level of deterrence expense with and
 without precommitment, the first-order con-
 dition associated with (6) should be evaluated
 at the cost-minimizing deterrence level Ot*
 for no precommitment. Such a comparison,
 while giving no definitive conclusions, im-
 plies that optimal deterrence expense under
 precommitment is apt to exceed that with no
 precommitment when either inflexibility
 costs are high or ft is near Qt in value. In
 the latter case, preconmmitment does not sig-
 nificantly alter the likelihood of attack. Ben-
 efits from precommitment comes from its
 ability, if any, to change terrorists' beliefs,
 5A more technical version of this paper, available
 upon request, contains the comparative statics details.
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 p,, and hence alter the probability of attack.
 Terrorist groups that do not believe the
 government's statement or its resolve will
 not be swayed. As long as n, > h for some
 realizations, the time consistency problem
 can always surface as recent events in
 Lebanon have shown. Constitutional con-
 straints or congressional hearings imposing
 huge perceived cost on those officeholders
 who capitulate may be the only means of
 raising h sufficiently to make precommit-
 ment time consistent.
 III. Multiperiod Models and Reputational Effects
 In the context of hostage-taking incidents,
 reputational effects refer to the influence that
 the current government's negotiating behav-
 ior has on the beliefs of the terrorists con-
 cerning the government's willingness to grant
 concessions in the future. As before, p, de-
 notes the terrorists' beliefs concerning gov-
 ernment capitulation in period t, and Pt?i
 represents their next-period beliefs. We as-
 sume the following updating behavior: (i)
 P?+ i = Pt if there is no opportunity to negoti-
 ate in period t; (ii) p,+ 1=p 1 < p if the
 government refuses to capitulate after a suc-
 cessful attack; and (iii) pt+I = p' Pt if
 the government capitulates in period t. Let
 i -l(pt+?) represent the (minimized) ex-
 pected cost, from the current government's
 perspective, of an optimal program starting
 at t + 1, with terrorist beliefs pt.+1 Since an
 increase in p augments the likelihood of
 attack, and therefore costs, dJt 1 /dpt + 1 > 0.
 Public choice considerations are important
 when analyzing reputation effects. For exam-
 ple, governments that cannot or do not ex-
 pect to be reelected would be unconcerned
 about reputation cost unless they are altruis-
 tic towards their successor. Even in the latter
 case, reputation may be nontransferable
 when terrorists do not believe that the cur-
 rent government's toughness will set the
 negotiation posture for the succeeding ad-
 ministration. To capture this aspect, we dis-
 count reputation costs by the probability v
 that the current government is in office in
 the ensuing period. The undiscounted future
 cost associated with a government capitula-
 tion is
 (7) At+,1(pt) Jit+l(P,pl)- j+?(p1t+)
 ?0.
 Given an attack, the government will negoti-
 ate expost if, and only if, n, > [h + 8At +X1I,
 where 8 denotes the natural discount rate.
 Deterrence expenditures are chosen ex ante
 to minimize6
 (8) TCt = H(Ot) + Q,O,a
 + 6 [(1 - ot) + Q,ot] [7TJ?,+(Ip)
 + (I1- 70 it+ (PO)] + &2,(I - Ot)
 x {8 [zJ,l( t+)
 + (I 1-7)j,+1(Po)]
 + E(min[nt, h + 7TvMt+dL)},
 where po is the reputation inherited by a
 new government. Equation (8) assumes the
 states of the world depicted in Figure 1, as
 well as the possibility of reelection or defeat
 for the government in the ensuing period.
 On the right-hand side of (8), the first term is
 the deterrence cost; the second is the ad-
 ditional expense (exclusive of reputation
 cost) to the government in the event of a
 terrorist attack failure; the third is the repu-
 tation cost in the event of no negotiation
 opportunities; and the fourth is the reputa-
 tion costs in the situation of negotiation
 opportunities. If the government does not
 expect to be in office (7T = 0), the ex post
 negotiation rule and the cost-minimizing de-
 terrence choice associated with (8) would be
 equivalent to the single-period case where
 reputation is unimportant.
 Another case where reputation does not
 matter is that of exogenous expectations, or
 Nash-Cournot behavior, where pt+l = Pt for
 6Equation (8) also provides the recursive equation
 for determining JI ?( )
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 all t. That is, the terrorists do not use period
 t outcomes and observations to modify their
 beliefs about the government's willingness to
 capitulate. Since pt,, is then independent of
 time t outcomes, At+, is identically zero.
 Equation (8) then implies that the govern-
 ment's time-consistent solution is to negoti-
 ate if, and only if, nt > h, as in the single-
 period model. The cost-minimizing choice of
 Ot is also unchanged from that of the single-
 period model.
 This solution is not so naive since what
 really matters is not reputation per se, but
 rather the government's ability through its
 words and acts to alter that reputation. If
 terrorist groups believe that they have per-
 fect information concerning h and the distri-
 bution of nt, there is no reason for them to
 modify their beliefs due to time t events. If
 the terrorists are convinced that the govern-
 ment adheres to the time-consistent rule of
 capitulating when nt > h, then, with perfect
 (perceived) information, the terrorists will
 set pt = prob[nt> h]. Moreover, under the
 circumstances, this will be the optimum
 negotiating rule for the government. Hence,
 we conclude that reputational effects are im-
 portant only under imperfect information.
 Nihilistic terrorist groups (for exam-
 ple, Japanese Red Army, Direct Action in
 France) have a strong distrust of the govern-
 ment's words and deeds and may well oper-
 ate under the perception, false or otherwise,
 of perfect information. If such is the case,
 then, unless precommitment can eliminate
 attacks, and there is no assurance of that,
 the government faces time-inconsistency dif-
 ficulties when they precommit.
 When, however, terrorist groups learn so
 that their future beliefs are shaped by the
 government's current behavior, current ca-
 pitulation by the government will increase
 future attacks (At+ > 0), thereby raising
 costs from negotiations. With these repu-
 tation costs, the government will negotiate
 ex post only if n, > [h + gM, , 11( p,)]. Hence,
 the ex ante true probability that the govern-
 ment will negotiate is a,= prob[n, > (h +
 r8?t+ )]. Hence, an increase in S or At+,
 will, ceteris paribus, decrease the likelihood
 of capitulation. Since reputation depends on
 terrorist beliefs, pt, and the updating rule,
 the optimizing choice for deterrence depends
 upon initial conditions and the way in which
 terrorists learn or modify their beliefs. Thus,
 an analytical solution is not possible.
 If the terrorists have access to the same
 information set as the government, both
 agents will know the true probability that
 the government will capitulate and pt = a,.
 Since a, will then be independent of t -1
 events, at,-, (and hence p + ) will, by induc-
 tion, be independent of time t events. Under
 full information, there are consequently no
 reputation issues involved in the negotiation
 decision. The only consistent means of mod-
 eling reputation is to assume that the ter-
 rorists are uncertain about some aspect of
 the government information set. Strategic
 behavior then enters when subsequent events
 are used to modify the terrorists' priors.
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